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Politics, Policies, and Poverty in Latin America 
Jennifer Fribble, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens 
Poverty has long been recognized as one of the most serious and lasting problems fac- 
ing Latin America. Recent data from the United Nations' Economic Commission on 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) show that 41 .7 percent of Latin Americans 
lived in poverty in 2004, while 17.4 percent lived in extreme poverty.1 Despite this gen- 
erally high level of poverty, there is significant variation among Latin American states. 
Indeed, in 2002 the share of individuals living in poverty varied from a low of 15.4 per- 
cent in Uruguay to a high of 77.3 percent in Honduras (see Table I).2 These differences 
are not exclusive to income-based poverty but also exist for indicators of basic-needs 
poverty. In this vein, ECLAC estimates that about 29 percent of the Nicaraguan popula- 
tion was undernourished in the late 1990s, while only two percent of Argentines 
suffered from the same nutrition problem.3 In short, variation in the prevalence and in- 
tensity of poverty in Latin America is striking and points to an important puzzle: why 
do countries exhibit such stark differences in their ability to protect citizens from 
falling into poverty? Put differently, why, despite the similar constraints imposed by 
globalization, unstable political regimes, and late industrialization, do countries in the 
region vary in their ability to reduce poverty? This article seeks to find an answer to this 
question, paying special attention to the issue of how politics shapes a state's ability to 
reduce poverty. 
This focus on the role of politics- political regime type, parties, and state- 
provided social policy - builds on a growing body of research about the political econ- 
omy of Latin American poverty. This new line of investigation has begun to move away 
from the Washington Consensus' nearly exclusive focus on the impact of economic 
growth on poverty reduction and toward a more nuanced view of the achievement of so- 
cial welfare. At the height of the neoliberal Washington Consensus, economists and pol- 
icymakers stressed that Latin America's high poverty levels were largely the result of 
slow growth.4 This explanation gained support in the wake of the 1982 debt crisis and 
was maintained throughout the 1 990s by national and international technocrats, who ar- 
gued that Latin America's poor economic performance was the result of decades of "in- 
efficient" economic policy in the form of trade barriers, exchange rate controls, and a 
large public sector. Proponents of the Washington Consensus encouraged governments 
to liberalize their markets with the aim of boosting economic growth. This growth in 
GDP was expected to have automatic spill-over effects, such as increased employment 
and poverty reduction. In essence, technocrats suggested that, with the proper eforms, 
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Table 1 Poverty Rates in Latin America and the Caribbean 2000 to 2002 
Argentina 45.4 
Bolivia 62.4 
Brazil 37X~ 
Chile 2072~ 
Colombia 54.9 
Costa Rica 20.3 
Dominican Republic 44.9 
Ecuador 49.0 
El Salvador 48.9 
Guatemala 60.2 
Honduras 77.3 
Mexico 39.4 
Nicaragua 69.3 
Panama 34.0 
Paraguay 61.0 
Peru 5Ï8 
Uruguay 15.4 
Venezuela 48.6 
Average 2000-02 46.9 
Average all country ears 39.2 
1 Oth percentile all country ears 1 6.6 
90th percentile all country ears 65.0 
Cell entries are the percentage of individuals who live below the ECLAC-established poverty line, most 
recent date available. 
countries in the region could "grow" themselves out of poverty. In this way, the 
Washington Consensus painted a picture of Latin American poverty in which politics 
was of marginal importance, and the policy prescriptions paid little attention to political 
factors that mediate the effects of growth on poverty. 
This view of poverty reduction began to be challenged in the late 1990s, when 
after several years of steady growth in Latin America many countries continued to lag 
behind in poverty reduction. The puzzle presented by the coexistence of economic 
growth and high levels of poverty prompted a revision of the most orthodox versions 
of the Washington Consensus. Indeed, several new studies stressed the importance of 
public policy in determining poverty levels. This new policy-oriented approach to 
poverty reduction was supported by international financial institutions, uch as the 
World Bank, and a new "human capital" approach to poverty reduction began to attract 
attention.5 
While this new approach to poverty reduction recognizes the important role of 
public policy, particularly investment ineducation and healthcare, it still pays relatively 
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little attention to domestic political factors such as the nature of parties, regime 
type, and the institutional structure of the state. This neglect of political differences 
among countries is shortsighted; differences in political regime type and partisan 
ideology have an important effect on cross-national variation in Latin American 
poverty.6 
This article tests hypotheses about the political determinants of poverty against 
economic and sociodemographic variables using an unbalanced pooled time series 
design. The analysis confirms expectations that politics have a significant and sizable 
effect on poverty levels in the region. In particular, political regime type and the parti- 
san balance of power are both significant predictors of poverty levels. The study also 
finds strong support for the importance of effective ducation policy in promoting 
poverty reduction. 
Poverty in Latin America: Previous Findings and Hypotheses 
Although the effect of politics on poverty levels in Latin America has not been ex- 
plored in cross-national statistical research, several small-n studies suggest that poli- 
tics is important in explaining variation in the region. Weyland, for example, finds 
that fragmentation of the state, weak parties, and problems of bureaucratic politics have 
slowed attempts to improve social outcomes, such as poverty and inequality in Brazil.7 
Similarly, Huber finds that the balance of power between supporters and opponents 
of neoliberal reforms and the degree of power concentration in political institutions 
explain variation in Latin American states' social policy reform paths in the neolib- 
eral era.8 Finally, a recent study about economic and social progress in Latin America 
finds that the design of political institutions has profound effects on the quality 
and nature of policy outputs in the region, including policies related to poverty 
reduction.9 
Accordingly, there is good reason to hypothesize that politics plays a key role in 
determining cross-national differences inLatin American poverty levels. A country's po- 
litical regime type, specifically its historical record with democracy, is of fundamental 
importance in determining poverty levels. Several studies have found that democracy is 
good for the poor.10 Ross, by contrast, argues that democracies do not exhibit less 
poverty than authoritarian regimes if one considers nonincome poverty and corrects for 
the sampling bias generated by missing data from authoritarian governments.11 Despite 
Ross' evidence, it is hypothesized that democracies in the Latin American region offer 
better protection against poverty than nondemocracies for several reasons. First, democ- 
ratic leaders are more responsive to the needs of their population because they can be 
held accountable for their actions. Second, with very few exceptions (Cuba, which is not 
in the data set used here because of data problems, Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, 
Peru under Velasco, Panama under Torrijos, and Ecuador under a short-lived military 
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government), the alternative to democratic regimes in Latin America has been authori- 
tarian regimes of the right, not of the left. 
Democracy provides a setting in which underprivileged groups enjoy greater free- 
doms to organize, mobilize, and demand protection against poverty, but it does not en- 
sure that these citizens will prosper. A key factor that links democracy to improved wel- 
fare outcomes is the effective representation of the interests of underprivileged sectors. 
In Latin America, parties that represent the interests of excluded sectors have been able 
to consolidate and achieve major legislative representation ly under prolonged fully 
democratic rule. Under authoritarian regimes and semidemocracies alike, parties de- 
fending the interests of the privileged suffered less repression or exclusion. Thus, 
democracy helps the poor by allowing the creation of organizations that represent their 
interests. The effect, however, will be strongest in situations of sustained democratic 
rule, and thus this study measures the cumulative value of the variable. 
In addition to democracy, the impact of different kinds of authoritarianism on
poverty is considered in this article. One basic distinction isbetween populist and con- 
servative authoritarianism; the other one is between mildly and highly repressive author- 
itarian regimes. For instance, the Peruvian military regime under Velasco from 1968 to 
1975 was somewhat populist and was very mildly repressive. It introduced redistributive 
reforms, allowed few human rights violations, and let popular organizations flourish. 
Others, such as the conservative and highly repressive bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regimes in Argentina and Chile, redistributed income upwards and killed, tortured, and 
incarcerated thousands of their citizens, particularly targeting leaders of the left, orga- 
nized labor, and other social movements. Itis therefore hypothesized that extended rule 
by repressive authoritarian regimes increases poverty. Yet this effect is expected to be- 
gin to fade after the replacement of the repressive regime with a democratic one. In 
other words, the effect often years of repressive authoritarian rule in the 1960s on 
poverty in the 1990s will be weaker than the effect often years of repressive authoritar- 
ian rule in the 1980s. 
An additional political factor expected to influence poverty is the distribution of 
power between different political parties. In Latin America there is evidence to suggest 
that left-wing parties structure welfare policies, both transfers and services, to benefit 
lower income groups in particular. This point is important to stress because critics have 
often accused left parties of defending only the interests of a "labor aristocracy." While 
several left parties in the region do have ties to labor organizations, they have also fa- 
vored investment in primary and secondary education and effective access to free 
healthcare for the lowest income groups. This emphasis among left parties is evident in 
both the expansionary phase of Latin American welfare policy and during the contem- 
porary neoliberal era. 
The policies of Chile's Unidad Popular (UP) government between 1970 and 1973 
offer an example of how left parties responded to the needs of the poor during the ex- 
pansion phase of welfare policy. One of the UP's early reforms provided nutrition 
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services to all pregnant and nursing mothers regardless of their labor market status. The 
policy was very successful, achieving universal coverage by 197 1.12 Between 1971 and 
1973 the UP government further xtended the nutrition program to cover all school chil- 
dren between six and fourteen years of age, administering a half liter of milk each day to 
needy students.13 Another example of the pro-poor focus of left parties during the ex- 
pansionary phase of Latin American social policy development can be observed in the 
creation of Costa Rica's national healthcare system in the early 1960s. In this instance, 
the left-leaning Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN) was the crucial actor in generat- 
ing and approving legislation that universalized access to healthcare. 
Examples of the pro-poor focus of left parties in the contemporary era include 
Chile's center-left Concertacion governments, which increased social spending particu- 
larly for education and health, contributing to a dramatic decrease in poverty levels. 
More recently, Uruguay's left party, the Frente Amplio, created a new social assistance 
program (Plan de A tendon Nacional de Emergência Social), which seeks to expand the 
coverage of social assistance to sectors of the population that have been left out of other 
programs. The left-leaning Brazilian Worker's Party has also demonstrated the commit- 
ment of the contemporary left to expanding coverage to underprivileged sectors by 
increasing the funding for social assistance to families that do not have access to 
employment-based benefits.14 
These examples suggest hat, while Latin America's left parties were and continue 
to be quite different from their European counterparts with regard to the strength of 
programmatic linkages and the character of their base, they have nonetheless demon- 
strated an interest in structuring social policy in a way that benefits the poor. In light of 
this evidence, it is hypothesized that a balance of power that favors the left will have a 
negative effect on poverty. Since Latin America's presidential democracies grant a great 
deal of power to the executive in initiating legal proposals and building reform coali- 
tions, the balance of power in both the legislative and the executive branches of govern- 
ment is expected to influence poverty levels. 
The partisan balance of power is not the only political factor that may affect 
poverty. Studies suggest that spending patterns and the design of social welfare pro- 
grams have an impact on poverty levels in Latin America.15 Government efforts to re- 
duce poverty generally fall into two categories: services and transfers. Social services, 
such as education and healthcare, work to reduce poverty and indigence by improving 
human capital and creating a more equal distribution of skill levels and life chances. 
Furthermore, such services are often distributed as rights of citizenship and thus pro- 
vide better coverage for all sectors of society than transfers.16 For the purpose of this 
study, this category of spending will be referred to as health and education. Of course, 
improvement of human capital requires a record of sustained investment inhealth and 
education and will be effective in reducing poverty only over the medium and long run. 
Therefore, the cumulative average of spending on these programs needs to be analyzed, 
and a negative effect on poverty is expected. 
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An important critique of social spending in Latin America, of course, has been that 
it is often inefficient and poorly targeted. Outright corruption or excessive public em- 
ployment may reduce the impact of spending on desired results. This problem affects 
both transfers and services. Indeed, the allocation of health and education spending to 
tertiary schooling and expensive curative medicine will do less for poverty levels than 
investment inbasic education and primary healthcare. Therefore, a more direct measure 
of the efficiency of education policy, average years of education of the population, is 
included. This measure is a good proxy of the efficiency of education policy, and it is 
expected to have a negative effect on poverty. 
The use of average years of education as a proxy measure of policy effectiveness 
requires some explanation. The variable, which reports the average number of years of 
education for adults aged twenty-five and older, provides insight into how long chil- 
dren stay in school in a given country. School abandonment is a significant problem in 
Latin America; a 2002 ECLAC study found that in Latin America's urban areas more 
than half of the number of children who drop out of school without completing the pri- 
mary cycle belong to the bottom 25 percent of the income distribution.17 The reasons 
for school abandonment are manifold, but public policy research reveals that the way 
in which educational funds are spent influences whether or not children complete their 
schooling.18 In particular, ECLAC finds that increasing the provision of preschool 
education, introducing and/or expanding targeted subsidies to high risk schools, cre- 
ating conditional cash benefits, and improving the accessibility of schools are all 
policies that have contributed to a reduction in dropout rates among poor students.19 
Put differently, the ECLAC study reveals that states which direct education funding to- 
ward certain types of programs will expand the years of schooling among low income 
students. Therefore, the variable average years of education of the adult population is a 
more direct measure of the effectiveness ofeducation spending in a given country.20 
One challenge in analyzing the effect of education on poverty outcomes is the issue 
of endogeneity since high levels of poverty could result in lower education levels be- 
cause poor families are more likely to pull children out of school early. To address this 
problem, a measure of education that is operationalized with a sizable time lag is used, 
thus ensuring that the particular elationship of interest is tested. We use Barro and 
Lee's measure of average years of education of the population aged twenty-five and 
older, which assesses how coverage of education in the past affects current poverty 
levels.21 This time lag means that it is logically impossible for reverse causation to exist 
since current poverty levels cannot predict past education experiences. 
A second set of policies that countries employ to address poverty is the provision 
of subsidies or transfer payments to needy individuals/households. For the most part, 
these benefits are tied to payroll contributions and thus recipients must participate (or 
have participated in the past) in the formal abor market. Recent evidence suggests 
that pension spending and other types of contributory social insurance in Latin 
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America are regressive because only formal sector workers enjoy access to the bene- 
fits and because benefits are earnings-related.22 Many countries in the region also 
offer some form of noncontributory (targeted) cash transfers. Since roughly half of Latin 
American workers function in the informal sector, and because wages in the informal 
sector tend to be lower than those of formal workers, it is likely that noncontributory 
(targeted) cash transfers are the most important form of income support for families at 
the very bottom of the income distribution. 
Unfortunately, data on social welfare spending in Latin America do not distin- 
guish between contributory and noncontributory benefits and lump all transfer pay- 
ments into one category: social security and welfare expenditure. Traditionally, the 
bulk of Latin American transfer spending has been allocated to pensions.23 Therefore, 
consideration of the effect of social security and welfare expenditure essentially cap- 
tures the impact of pension spending on poverty outcomes. In light of the evidence 
that Latin America's pension systems are highly inequitable, their ability to reduce 
poverty on average is doubtful. If, however, the size of the informal sector is con- 
trolled, higher social security and welfare expenditures may well have a negative effect 
on poverty. It can be assumed that controlling for the size of the informal sector intro- 
duces some rough correction for the share of social security and welfare expenditures 
that is accounted for by contributory benefits. Moreover, even families with formal 
sector workers can fall below the poverty line. Indeed, in some countries family al- 
lowances tied to formal sector employment help households with several children stay 
above the poverty line; and noncontributory pensions, although generally lower than 
the poverty line, contribute to the income of households with elderly members and 
may raise combined household income above the poverty line. The same is true for 
noncontributory conditional transfers to families with children. In light of this contra- 
dictory evidence, the hypothesis about the effect of social security and welfare spend- 
ing on poverty levels is nondirectional. 
In summary, the political explanation of poverty offered here involves the conflu- 
ence of three separate factors: regime type, partisan power distribution, and policy de- 
sign. The theory specifies a chain of events that is expected to result in lower levels of 
poverty. The ideal-typical sequence involves an extensive experience with democracy, 
the emergence of a left-of-center party that gains control of the legislative and execu- 
tive branches, and the subsequent reformulation fsocial programs in a way that places 
expenditure emphasis on human capital formation and ensures that transfer payments 
are delivered to individuals in greatest need of income support. This process constitutes 
the ideal type of the "politics" of poverty reduction. It does not mean that, if one ele- 
ment in the process is weak or missing, poverty reduction is impossible, but rather that 
the most successful countries will exhibit all three elements. Table 2 summarizes the 
variables examined in this analysis and the expectations about their effect on poverty 
levels. 
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Table 2 Variable Descriptions, Data Sources and Hypothesized Effects for the Analyses 
of Poverty Levels in Latin America 
Hypothesized 
Variable Description impact 
Dependent Variable 
Poverty Percentage of households that live below the - 
ECLAC-established poverty line.3 
Independent Variables 
Methodological controls 
Debt crisis 1982-1989 
Recovery 1990-2001 +/- 
Economic, Socio-Demographic, and Structural Controls 
GDP (per capita) Per capita GDP in thousands of 1995 purchasing - 
power parity dollars.0 
Inflation Annual inflation in consumer prices (percent).0 + 
Informal Sector Percentage of workers classified as informal of + 
non-agricultural labor force. d 
Debt External debt as a percentage of GDP.b + 
Female Labor Force Percentage of working-aged women who - 
Participation participate in the formal labor force.a' b 
Trade Total exports and imports as a percent of GDP.b +/- 
Foreign Direct Net inflows of foreign direct investment as a +/- 
Investment Inflows percent of gross capital formation.0 
Industrial Employment Percentage of the labor force in industry.0 - 
Gini Estimated Gini index.e + 
Ethnic Heterogeneirty Dummy variable scored 1 if ethnic and racial + 
diversity is at least 20%, but not more than 80%.g 
Politics & Policies 
Years of Education Average years of total education for the - 
population aged 25 and older.c 
Health & Education Health and education spending as a percent of - 
Spending GDP. Value is the cumulative average of spending 
on these programs/ 
Social Security & Social security and welfare spending as a percent +/- 
Welfare Spending of GDP.f 
Democracy Cumulative years of democracy from 1945 to the - 
year of the observation/ 
Left-Right Ideological Cumulative index of ideological center of gravity - 
Center of Gravity in the lower house from 1945 to the year of the 
observation (see text)/ 
Executive Ideological Cumulative index of ideological center of - 
Center of Gravity gravity in the executive branch from 1 945 
to the year of the observation (see text)/ 
Sources: aUnited Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) (various 
years); bWorld Bank (2003); cBarro & Lee (2000); international Labour Organization (various years); 
eUN Wider Inequality Dataset (2005) [adjustments made by authors]; fHuber et al. (2005); gDe Ferranti et al. 
[coding done by authors]. 
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Measures of Independent and Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable in this study is the percentage of households living below the 
ECLAC-generated country-specific poverty line. The data are compiled from ECLAC 
studies, primarily the annual Social Panorama, and span the time period 1968 through 
200 1.24 The ECLAC measure was chosen rather than the commonly employed World 
Bank international poverty line of two-purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars per day. 
The benefit of using the two PPP dollars-per-day measure is that it permits unbiased 
cross-national comparisons.25 Several authors, however, criticize the measure, noting 
that it is too static and does not consider important differences inconsumption patterns 
and prices between countries. Minujin, Vandemoortele, and Delamonica contend that, 
as per capita income increases, it becomes more costly to purchase goods that are nec- 
essary for day-to-day life. The authors argue that "the relevance of a line fixed at US$1 
[PPP] per day is gradually eroded by economic growth and it is not even useful at one 
point in time to compare (or aggregate) the incidence of poverty across countries."26 
Even scholars who employ the World Bank poverty line note the measure's weaknesses. 
Psacharopoulos, Morley, Fiszbein, Lee, and Wood stress: "the simplicity of this reason- 
ing [the standard poverty line] neglects several persistent problems .... Age, sex, and 
work environment affect individual nutritional requirements; local customs influence 
dietary choice; while regional supply and demand patterns determine specific food 
prices."27 
Reddy and Pogge criticize the World Bank poverty measure and argue that it is 
more useful to construct unique poverty lines for each country that "possess a common 
achievement interpretation. Each poverty line would refer to the local cost of require- 
ments of achieving a specific set of ends."28 The authors note that, if common end 
goals are specified, then data can be compared across time and space even when the 
poverty lines are country-specific. We agree with Reddy and Pogge and contend that 
for the region of Latin America the measure that comes closest to this goal is that pro- 
vided by ECLAC. ECLAC calculates a poverty line for each country in the region. The 
line is based on the cost of a basket of food and nonfood items. While the basket of 
goods meets a minimum nutritional requirement (has common caloric and protein end- 
goals), it also reflects national consumption patterns, the availability of food items, and 
relative prices.29 Since common standards are used in the construction of country- 
specific poverty lines, a cross-national nd across time comparison is legitimate. 
This study analyzes the impact of policy (measured as social spending and average 
years of schooling of the adult population) on poverty outcomes. The measures of so- 
cial spending as a percentage of GDP are compiled from several sources. The series for 
social security and welfare spending is from the IMF. The construction of the health 
and education series is explained in the appendix.30 
For this article, health and education spending have been operationalized as cumu- 
lative averages for the period 1970 to the year of observation, while social security and 
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welfare spending have been measured year to year. This operationalization provides a 
better theoretical model of the impact of social spending on poverty because returns on 
investments inhuman capital are most discernible over long time horizons. It takes sev- 
eral years for government spending on education and health to have an impact on 
poverty since the investments require that children move through the system, upgrading 
skills and enjoying better healthcare. In addition to the long-term nature of the effect, 
improvement in health and education will be strongest in countries that maintain spend- 
ing for long periods of time. In other words, a high level of health and education spend- 
ing in one year will not be as effective at reducing poverty as moderately high spending 
over a long period of time. In the case of pensions and other transfer programs, how- 
ever, the effect of spending is immediate because the policies involve a cash payment to 
individuals, and it therefore makes theoretical sense to analyze the impact of social se- 
curity and welfare spending on a yearly (and noncumulative) basis. The two spending 
measures are available for 97 of the 106 country ears. 
The measure of democracy is taken from Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens' 
analysis of Latin American and Caribbean political regimes. With their definitions, 
colonies and all forms of authoritarian regimes are coded as 0, restricted democracies 
as .5, and full democracies as 1, and each country's score is cumulated from 1945 to the 
year of observation.31 This cumulative measure is appropriate for testing the theoretical 
argument that it is the strength of the democratic record that allows parties representing 
the interests of the underprivileged to emerge, consolidate, gain entry into the legisla- 
ture, and use their legislative position to shape policy. 
Party codings are an extension of Michael Coppedge's project that surveyed 
country experts to classify all political parties that contested elections for the lower 
houses or constituent assemblies in eleven Latin American states.32 Coppedge's cod- 
ings date back to 1912, and the classification scheme contains two primary dimen- 
sions and additional subcategories. The first dimension in Coppedge's coding scheme 
divides parties along the left-right ideological spectrum. The placement of each 
party on this cleavage is established by considering the social and economic policy 
positions of the party. Coppedge sought to capture the party's ideology and class ap- 
peals through an analysis of issue position and the prioritization of growth and re- 
distribution. He then further divides the left-right spectrum into five subcategories: 
left, center-left, center, center-right, and right. The second dimension that Coppedge 
considers in his coding is the religious-secular divide between parties. He also in- 
cludes three nonclassifiable categories in his coding scheme: personalist, other, and 
unknown. 
For country-years that overlapped with Coppedge's work, his codings are used with 
one exception. While Coppedge classified the Peronists of Argentina as "other" for all 
years, they are coded here as secular center-left or the period 1945 to 1973, secular 
center for the period 1974 to 1989, and secular center-right from 1990 through the pre- 
sent.33 In addition, Coppedge's work is extended by adoption of the coding scheme to 
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classify all parties that contested lower house elections for the country-years in the 
sample.34 
After classification of each party in the sample, the proportion of the seats held by 
each party category for every country-year in the analysis was summed.35 For this 
analysis, the religious and secular parties occupying the same position on the left-right 
dimension were combined into five categories: right, center- right, center, center-left, 
and left.36 For each democratic year, the left-right composition of the lower house was 
summarized by a scale of the legislative partisan balance of power, calculated accord- 
ing to the following formula. 
Legislative partisan balance = 0*r + .5*cr + 1 *c + 1 .5*cl + 2*1 
where r, cr, c, cl, and 1 are the proportion of seats in the lower house held by right, center- 
right, center, center-left, and left parties, respectively. For nondemocratic years, all cate- 
gories are scored as 0 because parties had no influence during periods of authoritarian 
rule. To model the impact of partisanship on poverty, the lower house legislative partisan 
balance score was cumulated. This procedure is important because the impact of parti- 
sanship on poverty will be strongest in settings where parties enjoyed sustained peri- 
ods of legislative influence. This fact has been well demonstrated in studies of ad- 
vanced capitalist welfare states.37 The lower house legislative partisan balance score 
was cumulated from 1945 to the year of observation for all countries in the sample. A 
similar cumulative measure for party affiliation of the executive was developed. 
The final political variable tested is the presence of highly repressive authoritarian 
regimes. Repressive authoritarian regimes were coded as a separate category, 1 for 
every year the country had a repressive authoritarian regime and 0 for every year with- 
out such a regime, based on the extent of human rights violations committed or toler- 
ated by the authoritarian government. Yearly scores were cumulated over the fifteen 
years prior to the year of observation, to capture the fading of the impact of repressive 
authoritarianism over time.38 The sources were country studies. These models also in- 
clude various sociostructural and economic variables that have been found to be impor- 
tant predictors of poverty in previous studies. 39 
Estimation Technique 
An unbalanced panel data set was used with 106 observations from eighteen Latin 
American countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Poverty figures were available only 
for varying time periods in each country. There are a minimum of two and a maximum 
of eleven observations per country. The data span the period from 1968 to 2001. 
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A central problem in estimating regression models from panel data is that the as- 
sumption of independence of errors across observations i unlikely to be satisfied. As a 
result OLS produces incorrect standard errors for the regression coefficients.40 One ap- 
proach to deal with correlated errors in panel data assumes serially correlated errors 
within each unit (country) obeying a unit specific autoregressive process (which may 
optionally be constrained to be the same across units). This approach requires what 
Stimson calls temporally dominated time-series of cross-sections, that is, data struc- 
tures consisting of relatively few units observed over many equally spaced time 
points.41 Since the average number of time points (six) is much smaller than the num- 
ber of units (eighteen), and the observations are not equally spaced, the data set used 
here precludes this approach. 
An alternative estimation strategy was adopted, combining OLS estimation of the 
regression coefficients, which provides consistent estimates of the regression coeffi- 
cients, with the use of a robust-cluster stimator of the standard errors. The standard 
(noncluster) Huber-White or "sandwich" robust estimator of the variance matrix of pa- 
rameter estimates provides correct standard errors in the presence of any pattern of het- 
eroskedasticity (unequal variances of the error terms) but not in the presence of corre- 
lated errors (nonzero off-diagonal elements in the covariance matrix of the errors).42 
The robust-cluster variance estimator is a variant of the Huber-White robust estimator 
that remains valid (provides correct coverage) in the presence of any pattern of correla- 
tions among errors within units, including serial correlation and correlation due to unit- 
specific components.43 Thus, the robust-cluster standard errors are unaffected by the 
presence of unmeasured stable country-specific factors causing correlation among er- 
rors of observations for the same country, or for that matter any other form of within- 
unit error correlation. 
The robust-cluster stimator of the standard errors is impervious to correlations of 
errors within clusters, but it requires errors to be uncorrelated between clusters. The lat- 
ter assumption might be violated if unmeasured factors affect he dependent variable in 
all units at the same point in time. Global economic fluctuations, such as the debt crisis 
period in Latin America in the 1980s, could produce such contemporaneous effects. To 
evaluate the potential impact of such unmeasured period specific factors, the models 
were estimated with indicator variables for the debt crisis (1982-89) and for the 1990s 
(1990-2000), the period of recovery; the baseline category corresponds to 1968-82. 
It is hypothesized that poverty will increase in the debt crisis years, and a nondirec- 
tional hypothesis is adopted with regard to the differences between the before and after 
debt crisis years. In order to check for robustness, the models were also estimated with 
panel corrected standard errors. All of the significant coefficients in the robust cluster 
estimations were also significant in the panel corrected standard error estimations. The 
robust-cluster estimates proved to be more conservative. 
A final estimation difficulty is the problem of endogeneity given that poverty has 
been hypothesized to be a cause of weak democracies. This problem is partly addressed 
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by the cumulative nature of the measure of democracy. It is a measure of democratic 
history, and current poverty cannot cause past political history. Nevertheless, ince it is 
likely that current poverty is correlated to past poverty, the proposition that the coeffi- 
cients may somewhat overestimate he effect of democracy on poverty cannot be re- 
jected. However, given the effect of legislative balance of power, there is support for the 
theoretical view that democracy reduces poverty over the medium and long run by 
making the emergence of parties to the left of center possible. Strength of democracy 
and the legislative partisan balance variable were very highly correlated (r = .93) and 
could not be entered into the same regression because of multicollinearity. 
Results and Discussion 
The results of the analyses are presented in Table 3. Model 1 is the original baseline 
model and includes all the control variables. Since inclusion of the variable "employ- 
ment in industry" in the baseline results in the loss of fourteen cases and does not im- 
prove the predictive capacity of the model, and since the variable is not significant, it 
was dropped from the analysis, and Model 2 was used as the baseline.44 The subsequent 
models presented in Table 3 build on the baseline and test a battery of political and 
policy-related variables. Model 3 adds the policy variables to the baseline model: aver- 
age years of education, cumulative average spending on health and education, and 
spending on social security and welfare. Model 4 adds the policy and regime variables, 
strength of the democratic record and repressive authoritarianism, and model 5 replaces 
the regime variables with long-term legislative partisan balance. Model 6 considers the 
effect of the legislative partisan balance without social spending, while model 7 does 
the same with the executive distribution fpartisan power. Finally, model 8 presents the 
impact of income inequality on cross-national variation in poverty. 
The ideal-typical political sequence described earlier is largely confirmed by the 
results of this analysis. As expected, a strong record of democracy, a long-term left- 
leaning balance of power in the legislature, and social spending all contribute o cross- 
national variation in poverty levels. Indeed, in contrast o Ross, this study finds that 
democracy is clearly good for the poor.45 The most likely explanation for this discrep- 
ancy between the studies is that Ross' is a worldwide set of countries whereas this set is 
confined to Latin America. Additionally, this analysis uses an income measure of 
poverty, while Ross focuses on infant mortality. The results of this analysis show that in 
the case of Latin America extended periods of full democracy have been good for the 
poor. Democracy has helped underprivileged sectors in Latin America by providing a 
setting within which these groups could organize and mobilize demands for better pro- 
tection. Moreover, the existence of political competition provides incentives to politi- 
cians to be responsive to such demands. A move from the tenth to the ninetieth per- 
centile on the democratic record reduces poverty by 10.4 percentage points.46 
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As pointed out earlier, the dominant alternative to democracy in Latin America 
since 1970 has been right-wing authoritarianism, not left-wing authoritarianism. 
Repressive authoritarianism is correctly signed but falls short of significance. When 
operationalized with alternative time lags, the variable remains insignificant in predict- 
ing differences inLatin American poverty levels. 
The results presented in models 5 and 6 of Table 3 also confirm the expectation 
that the strength of parties of the left relative to the center and right in the legislature is 
a significant and negative predictor of poverty levels in the region. The legislative parti- 
san balance is a significant and negative predictor of poverty levels when social expen- 
diture variables are excluded from the model. If spending variables are included, how- 
ever, the partisan balance of power loses its significance. This result suggests that the 
left influences poverty levels by structuring welfare policies to favor the poorest sectors 
of society. 
This result is particularly important in Latin America, where parties are often 
noted for their weak and personalistic nature.47 Itis often assumed that the prevalence 
of clientelistic exchanges between politicians and voters in Latin America has under- 
mined the ability of leaders to engage in programmatic politics. Evidence presented 
here, however, suggests that there are important differences among Latin American par- 
ties of the left, center, and right. The evidence further suggests that, despite pressures to 
conform to the neoliberal economic model, left parties continue to exhibit differences 
from their rightist counterparts with regard to the character of social policy formation. 
Interestingly, partisanship of the executive falls just short of significance. There 
are two ways of interpreting this finding. The strong agenda-setting power of Latin 
American presidents could be at least partially constrained by the legislature, or par- 
tisanship in the legislature works differently than on the executive level; representa- 
tives and senators are less likely to stake out centrist positions than their executive 
counterparts. 
The final element of the political process of poverty reduction described by this 
theoretical framework involves the design of social policy. Surprisingly, the most direct 
measure of human capital investment, public expenditure on health and education, is 
not a significant predictor of poverty levels in Latin America.48 This fact should not be 
interpreted to mean that investment in human capital is unimportant in reducing 
poverty levels, but rather that spending levels do not tell much about the effort made by 
governments to fight poverty directly or indirectly by improving human capital at the 
bottom of the income distribution. Indeed, the results in Table 3 suggest that the way 
expenditure is allocated matters more than spending levels. 
The results confirm that an effective ducation policy, defined as programs that 
increase the average years of schooling of the population, is a significant and negative 
predictor of poverty levels. Education spending that extends the provision of public 
preschool, provides subsidies to high risk schools, and invests in training for teachers 
in low income schools are all expenditure patterns that have been found to increase the 
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retention of students in Latin American schools. These sorts of education policies are 
effective because they structure expenditure in such a way as to privilege the risks fac- 
ing children at the bottom of the income distribution, amely, early school abandon- 
ment. The fact that the average number of years of education is a significant and nega- 
tive predictor of Latin American poverty levels underscores the value of well-designed 
education policy in reducing poverty. Moreover, the effect of this variable is quite large: 
a move from the tenth percentile to the ninetieth percentile in the average years of edu- 
cation results in an 1 1 .0 percentage point reduction in poverty.49 
The results in models 3 and 8 of Table 3 also suggest that income support policies - 
social security and welfare spending - are important tools in reducing poverty in Latin 
America. This finding is interesting as it suggests that, despite the well-known struc- 
tural inequalities built into the region's transfer systems, such spending does provide an 
important level of protection against poverty. The fact that the amount of social security 
and welfare spending is not significant when democracy is added to the model (model 
4) indicates that the structure of spending is more important than the overall amount of 
spending. Democracies reduce poverty in part by structuring spending to benefit he 
lower income groups. 
A result hat offers additional support to the political theory of poverty reduction 
advanced in this article is that income inequality, as measured by the Gini index, is a 
significant and positive predictor of poverty levels. Interestingly, the Gini is significant 
only when democracy and the partisan balance of power are dropped from the equation. 
This result suggests that one way in which democratic regimes and left-of-center par- 
ties contribute o lower levels of poverty is by shrinking the gap between rich and poor. 
Indeed, democracy and a left-leaning balance of partisan power have been found to de- 
press inequality in Latin America.50 These findings confirm that long periods of 
democracy provide a setting in which underprivileged sectors can voice demands and 
left parties can emerge to restructure welfare policies in a way that redistributes rights 
to the lower sector of the income distribution. 
The effects of the control variables included in the models are relatively unsurpris- 
ing. As anticipated, per capita GDP has a significant and negative impact on poverty 
levels, but the effect is somewhat smaller than democracy and effective education pol- 
icy, with a move from the tenth to the ninetieth percentile in per capita GDP resulting in 
a 8.3 percentage point reduction in poverty. On the other hand, the size of the informal 
sector has the same magnitude effect but in the opposite direction. Thus, since in Latin 
America in the last two decades growth in GDP has been accompanied by growth in the 
informal sector, the prevailing economic development model has been unsuccessful in 
reducing poverty on its own. 
Ethnic diversity has a consistently statistically positive impact on poverty, except 
when inequality is included in the equation. This result suggests that diversity increases 
poverty levels through igher levels of inequality. Finally, the debt crisis has a highly 
significant and consistent impact on poverty levels, and even in the recovery period of 
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the 1990s poverty levels remained higher than in the 1970s. The disappearance of the 
significant effect of the 1990s when inequality is in the equation suggests that the ine- 
galitarian consequences of the debt crisis policies account for the persistence of higher 
poverty levels. 
Conclusion 
This study sheds new light on the issue of cross-national variation in poverty in Latin 
America. The findings underscore the significant impact of partisan power and regime 
type in shaping differences inpoverty levels. The importance of the democratic record 
for poverty levels is one factor contributing to an explanation of the high levels of 
poverty in Latin America as compared to advanced industrial democracies. The result 
may also be reason for some optimism. As democracy deepens throughout the region, 
poverty levels should decline. 
The analysis also points to the importance of education in lifting citizens out of 
poverty. These results have important implications for both politicians and scholars of 
Latin American political economy. With respect to policymakers, politicians and tech- 
nocrats must be wary of social policy reforms that might sacrifice citizens' access to 
education. Indeed, one of the primary means of reducing poverty involves increasing 
the level of education. Thus, cutbacks in these programs could have disastrous effects 
for the well-being of the region in the longer run. By contrast, policies that seek to ex- 
pand children's years of schooling could have an extremely large effect on poverty re- 
duction. 
The importance of average years of education in determining cross-national differ- 
ences in poverty has implications for social policy beyond the education sector. In re- 
cent years Latin America has witnessed the expansion of a new breed of social policies, 
conditional cash transfers, that uses income supplements to generate incentives for 
families to keep children enrolled in school and to use medical services.51 Programs 
such as Bolsa Escola (Brazil), Chile Soldiario, PANES (Uruguay), and Progresa 
(Mexico) stipulate school attendance as a prerequisite for the payment of the cash sub- 
sidy. In this way, these policies seek to promote poverty reduction by providing income 
support and boosting the average years of education of the population. These findings 
suggest hat, if these programs are truly effective at increasing school attendance, they 
could have significant welfare-enhancing effects. 
Additionally, the finding about the significant poverty-reducing effect of social 
security and welfare spending suggests that existing transfer systems are somewhat 
effective at protecting the poor. Thus, rather than eliminate such programs, policy- 
makers should work to reform systems so that spending is more progressive. The 
aforementioned conditional transfer programs are one promising way of improving 
transfer systems. 
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The results of this analysis also have implications for scholars of Latin American 
political economy. First and foremost, he analysis underscores the need to bring poli- 
tics back in to research on the region's poverty problem. Focusing exclusively on eco- 
nomic factors or even on economic and policy factors is insufficient. Rather, a more 
complete explanation of variation in poverty levels across countries and across time 
must pay attention to the regime trajectory and the distribution ofpower between polit- 
ical parties. It is telling that, despite Latin America's generally weak party systems and 
an abundance of personalistic leaders, these models demonstrate hat politics and par- 
ties continue to matter a great deal. 
This study is not the first research on Latin American political economy to find 
politics to be important. Others have presented evidence in support of systematic polit- 
ical effects in economic and social policymaking.52 So far, parties and mass attitudes 
towards parties and other political institutions have been studied mostly by scholars and 
institutions concerned with the survival and quality of democracy as a political system. 
Scholars and institutions concerned with poverty and inequality need to take parties 
more seriously, as well. 
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